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The(coercive( power( of( the( state( is(unique(among( its( responsibilities.(And(
yet,(like(many(government(services,(incarceration(is(becoming(more(widely(
privatized.( These( forFprofit( prisons( market( themselves( as( a( solution( to(
stateFwide( and( local( economic( woes( alike.( Using( standard( regression(
analysis,( I( test( the( truth( of( these( claims( by( exploring( the( relationship(
between(privatized(prisons(and(local(economic(health(measured(by(county(
employment( rate(and( income(per(capita.( I( find(no(significant( relationship(
between( the( public/private( nature( of( a( prison( and( the( employment( rate,(
but(there(may(be(evidence(of(private(prisons(depressing(county(income.(As(
we( move( forward( in( the( 21st( century,( we( must( test( any( advertised(






Privatization of government responsibilities is a trend that is growing in political 
popularity among the American electorate. Many people blame the difficulties they 
experience or perceive when using government programs on an inept and inefficient 
government structure. This can cause people to favor transferring these programs and 
functions to the private sector, which is subject to the market pressures that the public 
sector lacks.  
The prison system is one example of this trend in privatization. The number of 
private prisons has grown at an increasing rate over the past 25 years. This reflects 
more than just the rise in the pure drive to privatize. Private prisons also appear as an 
answer to the modern problem of overcrowding in prisons due to vast increases in the 
amount of prisoners. More people are being sent to secure facilities for longer 
sentences than ever before1. The increase in total number of convicts put enormous 
strain on the existing prison infrastructure. Schneider (1999) argues that while budget 
pressure sounds like a plausible explanation for privatizing corrections, the real 
motivation lies in politics and ideology. As our society waxes penal and incarcerates 
itself, the capacity of the judicial corrections system must keep pace. Most notably, this 
has lead to an increase in private prisons. It also seems that there could be a positive 
feedback relationship between the two, as the rate of growth of private prisons and the 
rate of incarceration are positively correlated [Schneider 1999]. Prison privatization has 





others. Figure 1 shows the percentage of all prisons in a region that have been 
privatized.   
 
Compiled from ICPSR Prison Census 2005 
 
 Most private prisons in the United States are run by one of two companies: the 
Corrections Corporation of America and the GEO Group (formerly Wackenhut 
Securities). These companies bid on state contracts to privatize an existing prison or to 
build a new one. Typically, the company that can make the lower bid will be awarded 
the contract; then, they will either move into the formerly state-run facility and take over 
management operations or begin construction of a new facility. Clearly, these large 
corporations have an incentive to increase the number of private prisons in America. 
This has led them to develop strategies for convincing a state or community that they 
should build a new prison or privatize their existing prison. The most popular and 
commonly claimed advantage to private prisons is that they will create new jobs for 
people in the area and increase the economic well being of the community around the 




















effects when a county has a private prison rather than a public one. Specifically, I will 
examine per capita income and employment rates to see if there is, in fact, a significant 




First, it’s important to understand the theoretical justifications of prison 
privatization as well as the possible advantages and disadvantages. In “The Proper 
Scope of Government: Theory and Application to Prisons,” Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer, 
and Robert W. Vishny [1997] explore and propose a theoretical framework detailing 
when we should privatize government services and when we should not. They develop 
a model that combines cost and quality components in which the optimal ownership 
structure is the one that produces the most surplus. They use this model to compare 
two different ownership structures, namely public and private3. The authors begin by 
developing a First-Best model in which the good or service in question is fully 
contractible. Under these circumstances, the manager and the bureaucrat allocate effort 
toward quality and/or cost innovations at the level that produces the largest net social 
benefit surplus and divide that surplus between themselves using lump-sum transfers. 
Under private ownership, the manager ignores the deterioration of quality resulting from 
cost reduction, and, in their model, the private manager only gets half the benefit of a 






under governmental ownership, the publically employed manager fully accounts for 
quality reductions that accompany cost reductions since any cost cutting measure must 
be negotiated with the overseeing bureaucrat. Unfortunately, the public manager also 
surrenders half of the gains from quality and cost innovations since both must be 
cleared with her superiors. Hart et al. argue that the ultimate disparity in surplus results 
from incentive structures that lead public and private managers to devote different levels 
of effort to these innovations. They find that, in this simplest model, government 
ownership and management produces the most surplus most efficiently. 
However, complicating the model with competition, corruption and governmental 
patronage or favoritism, they find a stronger case for private sector management. This is 
not to say that as the model begins to more accurately reflect reality, the conclusion 
switches. Rather, as the model allows corruption and patronage to increase in the 
government and true competition to increase in the private market, the gap between 
governmental outcomes and private outcomes closes. Of the two governmental factors 
impeding the optimal outcome, corruption seems to be the more significant concern. 
Hart et al. expect governmental patronage to be less significant because the union 
wage premium was not very large when the paper was written in 1997. Governmental 
corruption in the prison industry is easier to find.   
Private prison companies employ powerful lobbyists and some politicians have 
invested directly in companies like the Corrections Corporation of America4. Additionally, 
the kind of true competition, competition for inmates, that could directly improve the 





convicts were allowed to choose where they would serve their sentence, it could 
encourage private companies to permit gangs to operate or allow drug use to attract 
more inmates. Alternatively, judges could choose which prison a convict would go to. 
This option is better, but not flawless. Theoretically, judges would send more inmates to 
better institutions, increasing their market share, but it is also possible that judges would 
choose lower quality prisons for a harsher penalty. This means that private companies 
would cater to different judges preferences, which do not necessarily coincide with 
social welfare5. As of this writing, I have not been able to find evidence of anyone 
attempting this type of competitive scheme. Judges have the ability to choose between 
prison and non-prison alternatives, but do not seem to be able to choose which prison 
will receive the convict.  
Ultimately, Hart et al. conclude that “public ownership is likely to be better when 
the adverse effect of cost reduction on quality is large.” Additionally, public ownership is 
is clearly superior when quality improvement is unimportant or when government 
employees have equal or greater incentives to improve quality6. The first condition is 
very likely met in the context of prison privatization: there are opportunities for cost 
reduction, but they could substantially reduce quality. For example, private prisons have 
a strong incentive to hire less educated, and thus lower wage, guards, and to spend 
less time administering unproductive and costly training. Under trained guards can 
result in an increase in violence and incidents between guards and inmates7. 







innovations in prison management seem to be fairly small8. Lower labor costs are the 
source of much of private companies’ typical cost savings. This is because private 
prison companies do not use union labor so they are able to maintain significantly lower 
wages and benefits9. All other things held equal, this difference, if it is present should be 
observable as lower per capita income in the local economies surrounding private 
prisons than public prisons.  
The Hart et al. model is built with a broad scope and is used in their paper to 
evaluate many different traditionally public services. One nuance of privatizing prisons 
that these authors fail to address is the unique situation of incarceration as an exercise 
of the coercive power of the state: justice and punishment are seen as a critical function 
of the government. John C. Morris incorporates this idea arguing that private prisons are 
a story of both government failures and market failures in “Government and Market 
Pathologies of Privatization: The Case of Prison Privatization” [2007]. Typically, the 
argument for private prisons consists of pointing out how private industry can address 
the failings of the government-run system. For example, privatization may be able to 
address inefficiency, governmental inflexibility, inflated costs, and other problems 
perpetually plaguing government programs. 
Ultimately, Morris makes three important conclusions. first, privatization might not 
always fix the government woes it purports to address, seeing as it may be difficult to 
balance a thorough contract with the pursuit of market efficiency. Second, there are 






Some prisons are private from the moment they are commissioned for construction by 
the state; others are previously state-run facilities where the managerial functions have 
been contracted out to improve efficiency or performance. Finally, it can be difficult to 
really unpack what is driving government failings, could simply be forms of market 
failures that become exacerbated were the management of the prison to be transferred 
to the market-driven private sector.  
Hart et al. [1997] place primary importance on contract writing in determining the 
success of a privatizing services traditionally provided by the government. They stress 
the need for careful, detailed and thorough contracts to ensure real accountability for 
quality standards among private providers. If the authors of the contract can be 
assumed to be infallible, Hart et al. argue, most if not all of the quality concerns at 
private facilities would be alleviated. However, because prison contracts are still 
incomplete, corruption and undertrained guards may be prevalent, and true competition 
seems implausible, the authors conclude that their theoretical model argues against 
prison privatization10. 
Brian Gran and William Henry [2007-2008] address contract writing in the 
increasing trend of transferring management and executive responsibilities from the 
public to the private sector. The first, and possibly most important, step in transferring 
responsibilities for running a prison is writing a comprehensive, clear and enforceable 
contract. In “Holding Private Prisons Accountable: A Socio-Legal Analysis of 
‘Contracting Out’ Prisons,” Gran and Henry evaluate three contracts between private 





the United States. Since only the American example applies to the scope of this paper, I 
will use Gran and Henry’s evaluation of the contract with CCA regarding the Northeast 
Ohio Correctional Center (NOCC) as a typical case for contractual details between the 
government and private prison providers.  
The government’s largest concern is limiting their liability. The contract language 
holds CCA accountable for incidents caused by staff, inmates or equipment11. The 
prison operator is treated as a contractor rather than a member of a governmental 
agency, which removes explicit governmental control over ground level decisions unless 
otherwise specified12. In the NOCC case, the contract gave stringent control over 
staffing decisions through the creation of the Contracting Officer: a government position 
housed at the prison. Other details about the prison’s staff such as the number of 
training hours required for guards are meticulously laid out in the contract, revealing the 
importance the government places on maintaining high quality staff on site. 
Specifications regarding entry and exit screenings for the inmates, record keeping and 
even the number of parking spaces reserved for government employees, all included in 
the contract language illustrate the meticulous detail of typical contracts.  
To counteract the incentive that profit driven prison companies may have to 
skimp on the quality of service in hopes of maintaining cheaper overhead, the NOCC 
contract outlines a quality control program that rewards superior execution of quality of 
service requirements in the contract. Most of these requirements are drawn directly from 






interest of keeping prisoners from escaping…or posing a danger to staff.” 13 The 
program is designed by CCA, and the government determines if the company’s 
performance was “’Acceptable,’ ‘Good,’ or ‘Superior’” based on information from CCA’s 
records. The monetary reward reflects the government’s assessment; an “Acceptable” 
rating merits no bonus, for example14. This way, the government is hoping to inspire 
service beyond the bare minimum by appealing to CCA’s bottom line.  
After completing the contract, inspection and enforcement are the biggest 
remaining challenges. The governmental process of inspecting privatized facilities  
requires additional resources, especially labor, to be done comprehensively. The onsite 
Contracting Officer helps with daily oversight, but the majority of the government’s role 
is limited to the right of periodic review. In this respect, the American contract differed 
from its international analogues: The Canadian and Australian contracts opted for more 
direct control over the decisions of the private prison firms, while the NOCC contracted 
gave CCA more room to make day-to-day choices with contract enforcement enacted 
through remote checks15. 
In the past 20 years, the building and maintenance of prisons have started to be 
seen as possibilities for spurring economic growth in a county. The appeal is similar to 
that of many publically funded projects: large construction projects inject money into the 
local economy through construction firms and quickly employ a large number of people 
in the area, even if only temporarily. Then, theoretically, the personnel needed to 







point, prisons don’t seem significantly more economically helpful than new schools or 
hospitals, but proponents of prisons as a development strategy suggest that the 
permanent jobs the prison provides could go to those demographics that often have a 
harder time finding employment than educational or health professionals. Most prison 
jobs don’t require any education beyond a high school diploma or extensive, specialized 
job experience, which makes them more likely employers for less educated and less 
economically successful groups16. CCA advertises broad categories of potential 
economic benefits through the privatization of prisons. Various pages of the CCA 
website claim direct, indirect, and induced employment; a revitalization of local 
businesses, as well as an influx of new companies; and local purchases of goods and 
services resulting from a CCA facility17. 
Model Development 
Many studies already exist that examine the actual cost difference to the state of 
running a public versus a private prison [(Cabral et al. 2010), (Bayer and Pozen 2005), 
(de Bettignies and Ross 2004); (Donahue 1989)]. However, far less research has been 
devoted to the potential economic impact of prisons on the counties in which they are 
located. Of that group, none of the articles I encountered considered the difference in 
economic impact between publically and privately run prisons, despite private prison 







In “Revisiting the Impact of Prison Building on Job Growth: Education, 
Incarceration, and County-Level Employment, 1976-2004,” Gregory Hooks, Clayton 
Mosher, Shaun Genter, Thomas Rotolo, and Linda Lobao (2010) analyze data on all 
new and existing prisons since 1960 to explore the relationship between these prisons 
and employment growth in US counties. They found that changes in the unemployment 
rate were equal between prison and non-prison towns and that there was no evidence 
that prisons contributed to job growth in growing counties. In fact, Hooks et al. found 
that prisons further impeded job growth in slow growing counties. Union requirements 
on public prisons can lead to find employees out of county, so the new jobs created by a 
prison do not always directly employ the people in the prison’s county18. The lack of 
union requirements in private prisons could lead to different hiring patterns that could 
affect the local economy.  
Research by Besser and Hanson (2004) questions the purported economic 
benefits of prisons. They find that increases in total nonagricultural employment, retail 
sales, average household wages, the total number of housing units, and the median 
value of owner-occupied housing were substantially lower in towns with new prisons 
than in nonprison towns (Besser and Hanson, 2004). Unlike many other public 
institutions, such as hospitals, the economic multipliers of prisons appear to be low. 
They do not attract other industries or foster the growth of new businesses the way that 
large public employers often can. Typically, only big chain general stores and 






do not solve the economic problems of rural areas in they ways they claim; in fact, there 
is evidence to suggest that new economic problems arise. The impacts of prisons are 
far-reaching and may include placing pressure on environmental resources, aggravating 
class and racial inequalities and raising rates of domestic violence (Gilmore, 2007:177). 
With such a broad set of implications, teasing out a specific relationship between 
privatization and economic impacts is complicated and conflated by many of the other 
effects prisons can have.  
This study is structured to explore the differences in strictly economic effects 
between publically and privately run prisons. I believe that any variation found in the 
effects of the two prison management schemes would be a result of the differences in 
the way the prison produces its service, namely, safe and effective incarceration. These 
would arise from the different incentives faced by a private versus public prison: private 
prisons are profit. As Hart et al. explained, private correctional companies have a 
stronger incentive to reduce costs and reap the increased profits, but it can cause them 
to overlook the harms of those cost reductions on governmental regulators and inmates 
alike. A public prison is incentivized to streamline costs much less directly and may 
focus more on quality improvements. Alternatively, public prisons may be more 
entrentched in the status quo, unable or unwilling to improve their model of 
incarceration.  
If a company is trying to reduce costs, they are probably going to look at their 
biggest expenses first; in the case of prisons, that expense is staff. One of the most 
important differences between public and private prisons is that private prisons are less 
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likely to have unionized workers20. This already makes staff cheaper for a private prison. 
However, they may also try to cut costs by hiring under qualified workers, reducing the 
time spent in training, increasing the percentage of total positions that are part time. On 
the other hand, private prisons have a bigger incentive to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness through labor innovations. Many prisons built by private companies are 
designed to function as well as possible with the smallest staff possible. This is done by 
designing and constructing the prison with attention to aspects like sightlines and 
chokepoints. Since private prisons tend to be less than maximum security, these types 
of innovations are more feasible. All of these actions could affect the well-being of the 
community since, theoretically, community members comprise the staff of the prison.  
The cost cutting incentive could also lead private prisons to reduce overhead 
costs in other areas as well. It might encourage them to reduce or eliminate important 
programs like drug rehabilitation or parenting skills workshops in an effort to save 
money. Elimination of these programs would negatively affect the prisoners, and by 
extension, the community once those inmates are released. Building maintenance might 
also suffer as the corporation tries to keep costs down. If a prison is not properly 
maintained, it becomes much less secure, and an increase in escapes would definitely 
affect the surrounding community. Private prisons may have a bigger incentive to start 
prison labor programs in an effort to bring in additional revenue. If this is the case, then 
the local workers would have extra job competition from the inmates, which could 
actually decrease the employment rate in the county since incarcerated people are not 





and Evans, 2001; Mosher, Hooks, and Wood, 2007-----Hooks 241]. Additionally 
counties where inmates labor outside the prison could depress wages in the county 
since prisoners are not typically paid even a minimum wage. 
There are also structural differences between publically and privately run prisons. 
Because of the nature of government-run programs, private prisons are likely to have 
less bureaucracy to contend with, which could decrease the amount of time it takes 
them to adapt to new circumstances or respond to problems in the management of the 
prison. It’s also possible that this lack of bureaucracy would allow them to purchase 
from local vendors. This would make the private prison a much larger economic benefit, 
as it would be a sizeable patron for local businesses. However, private prisons are 
almost always part of a much larger corporation. This could mean that they are supplied 
from natural sources along with the rest of the prisons owned by that corporation. It 
could also mean that corporate headquarters hire in a national rather than local market 
to fill jobs at the prison, especially advanced management positions. 
 
Nuts, Bolts and Iron Bars— Metrics Methodology  
The methodological considerations in the Hooks et al. study were helpful in 
structuring this paper. Since they measured the change in private employment as the 
dependent variable, many of their strategies easily translate for use in this study’s 
empirical model of private prisons’ effects on the employment rate. The most important 
regressor they used was the natural log of prisons in a county at the beginning of the 
period (established prisons) and the change in the number of prisons during the 7-year 
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period studied (new prisons). The authors controlled for construction employment, 
percent of population with high school diplomas, percent with bachelor’s degrees, and 
change in property taxes. Like any geographic unit of measurement, counties have 
limitations: one must control for spatial autocorrelation, regional effects and other scales 
of government. Hooks et al. used a state dummy for this purpose. 
Richard A. Easterlin’s “Interregional Differences in Per Capita Income, 
Population, and Total Income, 1840-1950” was helpful when choosing controls for the 
empirical model of per capita income model in this study. Easterlin argues for labor 
force industrialization and labor force participation rate as two of the major determinants 
of per captia income. Industrialization is incorporated in my models as the percent of the 
county income/employment generated through agricultural production. The labor force 
participation rate was constructed by dividing the sum of total persons employed (full or 
part-time) and total persons formally considered unemployed by the total number of 
persons between age 16 and 65 in the county. 
I chose to use per capita income and employment rate as my dependent 
variables because they are good indicators of the condition of a local economy. How 
much money is in people’s pockets? How many people are working? My hypothesis is 
that private prisons will have an effect on both of these measures. Exploring the effects 
of private prisons on per capita income should give me a good idea as to the extent 
private prisons are raising the overall standard of living in the counties in which they are 
located (if at all). I chose income per capita over gross county income to mitigate the 
effect of county population size on the results. The other biggest selling point for private 
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prisons is the idea that they are local “job-creators,” and that these jobs are “recession-
proof” and will draw employees from the surrounding area, since they don’t have to hire 
along the guidelines of government bureaucracy. If this is the case, the employment rate 
should be higher in counties with private prisons. During this economic downturn, 
private prison companies like CCA are promoting themselves as an answer to the 
economic woes of states and counties because of their ability to cut costs and save 
taxpayer money21. This is not a claim I will be testing, and I have not seen anything to 
suggest that prisons are behaving differently within local economies post-Great 
Recession than they were previously. If private prisons are bolstering the income of their 
communities, and helping to employ their citizens, the concentration of private prisons in 
a county should have a significant effect on income per capita and employment rate. 
Data 
 Two data sets were combined to explore the effects of different prison 
characteristics on county-level economic indicators: the Interuniversity Consortium for 
Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Prison Census 2005 and the ICPSR County 
Characteristics 2000-2007. The units of measurement in these two data sets are 
individual prisons and counties respectively. In order to create a homogenous unit of 
observation for the regressions in this study, the Prison Census data was collapsed to 
the county level so that each data point represents a “typical” prison for that county. So, 
for this county, the minimum-security dummy (1 if minimum-security facility, 0 if not) 
attached to each individual prison was averaged across all prisons in the county to 





with three prisons, two of them minimum security, that percentage, called “min” is .666. 
This can also be imagined as describing the “typical” prison in that county. So in the 
example county, the typical prison would be 66% minimum security. Each of the 
variables from the 2005 Prison Census were collapsed using either the mean, median, 
minimum, or sum of the data points for each prison in the county, as fully detailed in 
Appendix A: Variable Definition and Construction. The variable I constructed to measure 
the “privateness” of a county’s prisons is the dummy pcounty. pcounty = 1 when (the 
sum of all private prisoners in the county)/(the sum of all prisoners in the county) > .5 
and otherwise = 0. The mean of pcounty for the 698 observations is .0903 with a 
standard deviation of .2868.  
Table 2 provides some summary statistics and a test for the statistical difference 
of means between the two types of prisons. This table uses data on the individual prison 
level (with some noted exceptions). Here, some of the overarching differences between 
the two prison populations become obvious, allowing me to incorporate the appropriate 
controls into my model. Many of these differences may be indicative of differences in 
management structure, but by controlling for them in the model, I am able to tease out 
any difference in economic outcome arising solely from private management as 
opposed to the potential economic effects resulting from the differences that might lead 
one prison to be privatized while another is not. The types of facilities that are being 
privatized are not a representative sample of the overall prison population. They are 
much less likely to be maximum-security facilities, much more likely to be minimum  
security and are, on average, more than 15 years newer. 
Table 2: Private/Public Prisons Facility, Inmate and Programs Summary Statistics  
Public N Mean Std. Dev. Private N Mean Std. Dev. Difference of 
Means1 
Maximum security 972 0.300412 0.458673 Maximum security 106 0.066038 0.2495279 .0000 (5.1765) 
Medium security 972 0.37037 0.4831525 Medium security 106 0.339623 0.475831 .5334 (.6231) 
Minimum security 972 0.3107 0.4630183 Minimum security 106 0.59434 0.493352 .0000 (-5.9497) 
Year Built  1971.56 31.54944 Year Built  1988.292 15.57896 .0000 (-5.3876) 
Total Inmates  1090.993 1027.546 Total Inmates  702.1792 709.7949 .0002 (3.7974) 
% of County Population in 
Prison† 
620 .04105 .0570261 % of County Population in 
Prison† 
78 .04986 .0705419 .2121 (-1.2489) 
% Employed by Prisons† 620 .02872 .0441486 % Employed by Prisons† 78 .03040 .0532444 .7563 (-.3104) 
# Black Inmates 963 471.7321 451.3561 # Black Inmates 86 295.4767 362.9271 .0004 (3.5206) 
# Hispanic  Inmates 925 179.7081 383.5664 # Hispanic Inmates 84 206.5833 418.4437 .5419 (-.61014) 
Sentence > 1 Year 957 1040.1 1030.933 Sentence > 1 Year 83 743.9036 679.7331 .0103 (2.5689) 
Sentence < 1 Year 746 58.9933 161.7921 Sentence < 1 Year 64 51.625 129.745 .7230 (.3546) 
Total Staff 801 303.0549 240.5572 Total Staff 81 163.7407 135.1344 .0000 (5.1292) 
Percent Part Time 773 .0196341 .0424491 Percent Part Time 80 .0795734 .1279354 .0000 (-9.0873) 
Staff Per Prisoner 801 .3412163 .2595014 Staff Per Prisoner 81 .2821031 .1550551 .0444 (2.0135) 
Disciplinary Reports 942 1108.878 1483.062 Disciplinary Reports 88 613.4659 1007.375 .0022 (3.0675) 
Number of Assaults 363 11.80716 44.46435 Number of Assaults 20 7.5 13.17294 .6662 (.4317) 
Escapes 794 0.167506 0.9960335 Escapes 63 0.68254 3.85974 .0055 (-2.7820) 
Drug Treatment 972 0.19856 0.3991211 Drug Treatment 106 0.254717 0.4377719 .1734 (-1.3621) 
Medical Treatment 972 0.146091 0.3533788 Medical Treatment 106 0.04717 0.2130091 .0048 (2.8259) 
Mental Health Treatment 972 0.148148 0.3554297 Mental Health Treatment 106 0.084906 0.2800655 .0766 (1.7726) 
Boot Camp 972 0.021605 0.1454645 Boot Camp 106 0.009434 0.0971286 .4005 (.8410) 
Geriatric Care 972 0.045268 0.2079972 Geriatric Care 106 0 0 .0253 (2.2398) 
Library 972 0.003086 0.0554983 Library 106 0.009434 0.0971286 .3079 (-1.0202) 
Counseling 972 0.001029 0.032075 Counseling 106 0.018868 0.1367049 .0009 (-3.3244) 
Educational Services 972 0.002058 0.0453376 Educational Services 106 0.009434 0.0971286 .1713 (-1.3688) 
Work Release 969 0.149639 0.3569012 Work Release 90 0.322222 0.4699457 .0000 (-4.2586) 
Literacy Training 972 0.815844 0.3878112 Literacy Training 106 0.54717 0.5001348 .0000 (6.5640 
Drug Awareness 972 0.746914 0.4350039 Drug Awareness 106 0.575472 0.4966193 .0002 (3.7972) 
Alcohol Awareness 972 0.747942 0.4344177 Alcohol Awareness 106 0.556604 0.4991457 .0000 (4.2402) 
Psychological Counseling 972 0.660494 0.4737855 Psychological Counseling 106 0.481132 0.5020175 .0002 (3.6791) 
HIV/AIDS Counseling 972 0.573045 0.4948903 HIV/AIDS Counseling 106 0.462264 0.5009425 .0290 (2.1858) 
Sex Offender Counseling 972 0.403292 0.490811 Sex Offender Counseling 106 0.160377 0.3686989 .0000 (4.9448) 
Employment Skills 972 0.768519 0.4219965 Employment Skills 106 0.584906 0.4950791 .0000 (4.1777) 
Life Skills 972 0.830247 0.375609 Life Skills 106 0.754717 0.4322989 .0532 (1.9355) 






The typical private prison is also quite a bit smaller than the typical public prison. The 
mean total inmates privately imprisoned in any given facility is less than ¾ of public 
facilities, and the average number of black inmates is almost 40% less. The size of the 
staff of the average private prison is almost half that of a public one where 7.96% of the 
average private staff is part time compared to 1.96% of the average public prison. It is 
notable that the average number of escapes at private prisons, while still less than 1, is 
4 times larger than public prisons staff. Additionally, a one-tailed t test on the mean 
number of escapes with HA: MeanPrivate > MeanPublic yields a p value of .0028 which is 
significant at the 1% level.  
The programs typically offered by the two kinds of institutions are also different. 
Private prisons are much more likely to offer general counseling programs. However, 
publically run corrections will more often include literacy training, drug and alcohol 
awareness; psychological, HIV, sex offender counseling, and medical and mental health 
treatment, (or at least more likely to report it). It is especially interesting to note that 
private facilities are more than twice as likely to have work release programs, while 
public prisons will more often teach employment skills. These two kinds of programs 
could be important components in a prison’s overall effect on its local community. 
Equations 
Two empirical models were constructed. The first is used to look at prisons’ effects on 
employment in a county, and the second examines income per capita in the county. 
These two economic markers were chosen to try and examine different aspects of 
economic health in a county. Income per capita captures whether or not the overall 
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amount of wealth in a county is changing, essentially, if the pie is getting bigger. The 
employment rate tries to target the distribution of those changes, or, if everyone is 
getting a piece of this delicious growth. Naturally, it is crucial to find the right controls for 
a model dealing with such broad indicators, as the factors influencing both employment 
rate and income per capita are broad and varied. I selected potential control variables 
from the ICPSR data I had at the county level and used a simple two-group t test for the 
difference of means to find exogenous variation between public prison and private 
prison counties.  Table 3 provides a few summary statistics and details these results. 
The entries in bold had statistically significantly different means, so these are the county 
controls I chose to include in my model.  
Table 3: Public and Private Prison County Characteristics23  








Low Education 63 .3968 0.4931 Low 
Education 
635 .2299 .4211 0.0033 (-
2.9521) 
% Black 63 17.22 20.29 % Black 635 13.53 15.68 0.0844 (-
1.728) 
% Hispanic 63 16.06 22.08 % Hispanic 635 8.570 13.58 0 (-5.0166) 
% Emp by 
Construction 
56 .0583 .0196 % Emp by 
Construction 




56 .0592 .0282 %Earned from 
Construction 
603 .0675 .0326 0.0411 
(2.0466) 
%Emp by Ag 63 .1307 .1158 %Emp by Ag 629 .0843 .0925 0.0902 (-
1.6966) 
% Earned from Ag 60 .0677 .1542 % Earned from 
Ag 
623 .0432 .0947 0.293 (-
1.0524) 
LFPR 63 .5696 .0931 LFPR 635 .6006 .0776 0.7998 
(.2537) 
%Bush 04 63 55.04 16.95 %Bush 04 627 56.72 12.06 0.071 
(1.8084) 






Pop Growth '00-'05 63 2.218 7.766 Pop Growth 
'00-'05 
635 4.146 7.038 0.1936 
(1.3014) 








In the two models presented below, the subscript “i” denotes each individual county and 
the medium security and Midwest regional dummies were omitted. 
Model:  
EMPRATEi or INCPERCAPi = β0 + β1PCOUNTYi + β2PCMIN + β2MAXi + β3MINi + 
β4YRBUILTi + β5INMATETOTi + β5NUMBLKi + β6SENT>1YRi + β7TOTSTAFFi + β8%PARTTIMEi 
+ β9DISCREPSi + β10ESCAPESi + β11MEDTRTi + β12MENTLTRTi + β13COUNSELi + 
β14WRKRLSi + β15LITi + β16DRUGi + β17ALCi + β18PSYCHCi + β19HIVCi + β20SEXOFFCi + β21-
EMPi + β22LIFESKILLi + β23LOWEDUCi + β2%BLK + β24%HISPi + β25%EMPCONSTi + 
β26%INCCONSTi + β27%EMPAGi + β28%BUSHi + β29POPi + β30SOi + β31NEi + β32WEi 
 
Table 3: Variable Definitions 
Variable Description Variable Description 
EMPRATE County employment rate INCPERCAP County income per capita 
PCOUNTY Private/public prisons in county 
dummy 
PCMIN Interaction between privateness 
dummy and min ratio 
MAX Maximum security ratio MIN Minimum security prison ratio 
YRBUILT Average year prison was built  INMATETOT Total number of inmates in 
county 
NUMBLK Number of black prisoners SENT>1YR Number of prisoners serving a 
sentence longer than 1 year 
STAFFTOT Total number of prison staff %PRTTIME Percent of staff that are part time 
DISCREPS Number of disciplinary reports ESCAPES Number of escapes 
MEDTRT Medical Treatment ratio MENTLTRT Mental Treatment ratio 
COUNSEL Counseling program ratio WRKRLS Work release program ratio 
LIT Literacy training ratio DRUG Drug awareness program ratio 
ALC Alcohol awareness ratio PSYCHC Psychological counseling 
program ratio 
HIVC HIV/AIDS Counseling program 
ratio 
SEXOFFC Sex offender counseling 
program ratio 
EMP Employment skills program 
ratio 
LIFESKILL Life skills program ratio 
LOWEDUC Low county educational 
attainment dummy 
%HISP, %BLK Percent of county residents that 
are Hispanic/Black 
%EMPCONST Percent of the county employed 
by construction industry 
%INCCONST % of county income generated 
by construction industry 
%EMPAG Percent of the county employed 
in agriculture 
%BUSH Percent of the 2004 presidential 
election votes cast for Bush 
POP County population/10000 SO Regional dummy: South!
NE Regional dummy: Northeast WE Regional dummy: West 
!
!
Both models use standard OLS to find the best fit. Performing a Breusch-Pagan test on 
the initial regressions revealed heteroskedasticity in the model, so the results reported 




The results of both of my models are presented in Table 4. The resulting coefficients as 
well as the t statistics in parentheses that were generated using robust standard errors 
are displayed next to their corresponding variable. The first column is an equation with 
only the PPRATIO variable and the county-level control variables, while the second 
uses only the prison-specific variables and includes no controls for any variation 
between counties beyond the differences in their prisons. The third column includes 
regressions of my complete models. In the fourth and final column, I have eliminated the 
prison controls that were not significant in either of the two earlier models to try and 
reduce some of the statistical noise and concentrate on examining the effects of 
independent variables that appear to have some significant relationship to the 
dependent variables. The coefficients for the employment rate are much smaller than 
those for income per capita because they represent the influence each variable has 
upon the percentage of employed people in a county rather than on the total income per 
person in the county, which would be tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. Next, I 
will address the significant results for each of the two models beginning with the model  
for county employment rate.
Table 4: Employment Results24—***, **, and * mark significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
RH Variable Employment Rate Model 
 Controls 
Only 
Prison Specifics Full Model Ltd. Model 
pcounty -.0010 (-.33) -.0064 (-1.61) -.0016 (-.48) -.00174 (-.54) 
pcmin .0031 (.78) .0045 (.91) .0021 (.49) .00226 (.55) 
Max  -.0018 (-.84) .0003 (.17) -.00011 (-.06) 
Min  .0001 (.06) -.0020 (-1.16) -.00151 (-.9) 
Year Built  -.0001*** (-3.36) -.0000** (-2.42) -.00005** (-2.53) 
Total Inmates  .0001 (.84) .0000 (-.07) -.00001 (-.18) 
# Black Inmates  .0001 (-1.43) .0001 (.57) .00000 (.57) 
# Sentances  
> 1 Yr 
 .0001 (-.8) .0001 (-.1) 
-.00001 (-.03) 
Total Staff  .0058** (2.52) .0015 (.62) .00150 (.63) 
%Part Time  .0243* (1.79) .0094 (.57) .01093 (.67) 
Disciplinary 
Reports 
-.0000** (-2.54) -.0001*** (-3.26) -.00000*** (-3.1) 
Escapes  .0001 (-.0004) -.0004 (-.7) -.00043 (-.79) 
Medical Treatment .0023 (1) .0010 (.6)  
Mental Treatment  .0038 (1.64) .0044** (2.32) .00478*** (2.66) 
Counseling  -.0181*** (-2.89) -.0074 (-.73) -.00895 (-.89) 
Work Release  .0035* (1.67) .0039** (2.22) .00381** (2.26) 
Litteracy Training  -.0027 (-1.19) .0004 (.2)  
Drug Awareness  -.0094*** (-5.65) -.0074*** (-4.82) -.00767***(-5.16) 
Psych Counseling  -.0015 (-.78) -.0011 (-.62)  
HIV/AIDS Counseling .0051*** (2.98) .0029* (1.9) .00220 (1.57) 
Sex Offender Counseling .0002 (.1) -.0016 (-1.02)  
Employment Skill  .0012 (.55) -.0002 (-.1)  
Life Skills  .0098*** (3.9) .0037* (1.81) .00345* (1.82) 
Low Education -.0113*** (-5.61)  -.0104*** (-5.1) -.01045***(-5.21) 
%Black -.0002*** (-3.69)  -.0001** (-2.17) -.00014** (-2.18) 
%Hispanic .0000 (-.69)  .0001 (.81) .00006 (.93) 
%Emp by Construction -.0678 (-1.01)  -.0519 (-.77) -.04882 (-.73) 
%Earned from Construction .1351*** (2.71)  .1101** (2.2) .10574** (2.15) 
%Emp by ag -.0137* (-1.77)  -.0115 (-1.45) -.01231 (-1.6) 
%Bush 04 .0003*** (4.19)  .0003*** (4.95) .00033*** (5.09) 
County Population/1000 .0001*** (3.33)  .0001** (2.45) .00003** (2.39) 
South .0088*** (4.07)  .0060*** (2.73) .00630*** (2.92) 
Northeast .0096*** (5.57)  .0091*** (4.79) .00911*** (4.79) 
West -.0037 (-1.58)  -.0025 (-.93) -.00229 (-.86) 
Constant .9255*** (222.1) 1.0966*** (23.17) 1.0194***(25.75) 1.0221***(26.19) 
N 651 674 630 630 
F-stat25 18.14 (.00) 6.22 (.00) 10.88 (.00) 12.52 (.00) 




Table 5: Income Results26—***, **, and * mark significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
RH Variable Income per Capita Model 
 Controls Only Prison Specifics Full Model Limited Model 
pcounty -1932.71** (-2.12) -4590.94** (-4.73) -1837.66** (-1.98) -1802.72** (-2) 
pcmin 3864.63** (2.0) 4909.55** (2.19) 4285.09** (2.03) 4153.42 **(2.01) 
Max  -856.05 (-1.09) -448.01 (-.75) -426.90 (-.75) 
Min  941.15 (1.39) 129.40 (.24) 37.14 (.07) 
Year Built  -33.73*** (-3.37) -19.16** (-2.44) -20.64***(-2.66) 
Total Inmates  3.36*** (2.82) 0.13 (.13) .1477 (.16) 
# Black Inmates  -1.34 (-1.48) 0.001 (0) -.0229 (-.03) 
# Sentances > 1 Yr  -3.55*** (-3.1) -0.46 (-.57) -.5072 (-.65) 
Total Staff  5740.61*** (3.62) 1843.57 (1.41) 1918.22 (1.49) 
%Part Time  12592.74 (1.52) 1301.42 (.21) 1462.49 (.24) 
Disciplinary Reports  -0.51*** (-3.15) -0.15 (-1.07) -.139 (-1.03) 
Escapes  577.08*** (3.51) 207.26 (.74) 236.97 (.88) 
Medical Treatment  1021.13 (1.1) 894.58 (1.33)  
Mental Treatment  384.57 (.4) -208.86 (-.31)  
Counseling  -11850.90** (-2.28) -11549.3*** (-2.59) -11967.96*** (-2.78) 
Work Release  1657.14* (1.84) 1035.42 (1.55) 980.34 (1.48) 
Litteracy Training  -2553.63*** (-2.82) -626.66 (-.84) -596.00 (-.81) 
Drug Awareness  254.03 (.43) -125.37 (-.25) -944.34** (-2.13) 
Psych Counseling  66.50 (.09) 364.47 (.6)  
HIV/AIDS Counseling  767.17 (1.32) -755.48 (-1.53)  
Sex Ofender 
Counseling 
 -429.49 (-.69) -867.41* (-1.88)  
Employment Skill  238.12 (.34) -181.97 (-.34) -356.73 (-.65) 
Life Skills  2362.35*** (2.97) 354.29 (.55) 331.92 (.53) 
Low Education -4633.67*** (-7.3)  -4317.67*** (-6.62) -4345.22*** (-6.67) 
%Black -47.73** (-2.09)  -24.37 (-1.23) -22.50 (-1.16) 
%Hispanic -20.08 (-.83)  7.68 (.3) 8.81 (.35) 
%Emp by 
Construction 




75726.07*** (4.13)  70307.45*** (3.88) 
70005.59*** (3.85) 
%Emp by ag -22055.9*** (-8.23)  -21483.6***(-8.43) -21350.72*** (-8.39) 
%Bush 04 -88.01** (-2.29)  -53.50* (-1.7) -51.28 (-1.62) 
County 
Population/1000 
35.50** (2.08)  36.77** (2.01) 
36.47** (2.01) 
South 1759.68** (2.4)  1220.04* (1.78) 1141.65* (1.72) 
Northeast 3084.03*** (2.99)  3394.37*** (3.27) 3192.66**** (3.17) 
West 237.33** (.2)  -558.19 (-.52) -412.33 (-.39) 
Constant 35805.36*** (14.14) 91991.66*** (4.64) 71586.88*** (4.49) 74450.48*** (4.71) 
N 651 668 630  
F-stat27 41.01 (.00) 7.92 (.00) 23.13 (.00)  




Employment Rate          
First, the privatization variable, pcounty, was insignificant across all three 
iterations of the employment rate model. This means that controlling for differences in 
counties, prisons or both, the public/private nature of the management of a county’s 
prisons does not affect the employment rate in that county.  
The first set of regressions that were run with only the county level controls 
placed various levels of significance on most of the included variables. Only % Hispanic, 
% Employed by Construction, and the dummy for West were insignificant. This 
explanatory power remained when the prison variables were included in the final model 
for every control but % employed by agriculture.  
Perhaps the more interesting variables, those describing the prisons, were more 
prone to change with the inclusion of the county controls. Initially, the total number of 
staff at the prisons as well as the percentage of them that were part time had a 
significant positive impact on the overall employment rate for the county, while general 
counseling programs had a negative impact. However, once the county controls were 
introduced, these variables lost any explanatory power. Drug awareness programs 
maintained their significant negative effect. Life skills, HIV/AIDS counseling, and work 
release programs had a positive impact with and without the county controls. In fact, 
work release programs actually gained significance and magnitude once the controls 
were reintroduced. Disciplinary reports and the year in which the prison was built 
produce coefficients that appear trivial since they are so close to 0. However, both are 
negatively significant at the 1% or 5% level. So while the magnitude of the effect may be 
!
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small or the scale may be misspecified, both increased disciplinary reports and newer 
facilities depress the employment rate.  
Income Per Capita 
 Here we see statistically significant effects due to privatization. Both pcounty 
shows significant effects on income per capita at the 5% level in each of the three 
models. So, regardless of the controls used, counties with a higher share of prisoners in 
private facilities had significant lower incomes. This is not necessarily the case at 
minimum-security private prisons. pcmin, an interaction term constructed by multiplying 
pcounty and min, shows a positive effect that is also significant at the 5% level in each 
iteration of the model. A t test on the sum of the coefficients on pcounty and pcmin, β1 + 
β2, show an estimated sum of 2447.43, but a t statistic of only 1.34. This means that the 
sum of β1 and β2, is not statistically significantly different than 0 at the 5, 10, or 15% 
level. So, it seems that the more positive effects of private minimum-security facilities 
cancel out the generally negative impact of private prisons as a whole and may actually 
overpower them and generate positive outcomes for income per capita. Further 
research would need to be done to establish this connection beyond the simple test I’ve 
performed here.  
The county control variables behaved similarly to the controls in the employment 
rate model, except that % black lost significance and % employed by construction and 
agriculture were both significant throughout. Most of the prison level variables that 
returned statistically significant coefficients in the regression without county controls 
dropped that significance completely when the controls were reintroduced. General 
!
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counseling programs and the year the prison was built are the only exceptions, both 
remaining negatively significant at the 1% and 5% level.  
 
Discussion 
Because the explanatory power generated in the “prison variables only” 
regression is so weak given how many independent variables were added, I will focus 
most of my comments on the other three iterations of both models.  
The most significant result of this study is the possible negative effect of a private 
prison population on the income per capita of the inhabitants of those prisons’ counties. 
The full and limited models produce similar estimated coefficients on pcounty, so I can 
estimate that having a “private” prison population (more than half of the prisoners in the 
county are privately incarcerated) may lead to ~$1800 less in income per person on 
average. The most likely explanation for this effect is that private prisons are likely to 
pay their employees a lower salary than their publically run counterparts.  This seems 
like an intuitive explanation given the profit motive of a privately run prison. This study 
does not incorporate any measure of the quality or qualifications of a prison’s staff, but it 
is also possible the private prisons are hiring less qualified staff and thus ould pay them 
less.  
This negative impact on income is not necessarily seen in minimum-security 
prisons. The pcmin variable has a significant positive coefficient, and when the two are 
summed, I cannot reject that, β1 + β2 = 0. So, it seems that some positive impact on 
income per capita from private minimum-security prisons is negating the negative 
!
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impact of private prisons in general. To further explore this relationship, and discover if 
private minimum security prisons are actually beneficial to income per capita when 
compared to public prison, I ran an additional set of regressions with the world limited to 
only minimum security facilities. The results of these regressions are reported in Tables 
D and E in Appendix B. While the estimated coefficient on pcounty is positive in this 
regression, a t statistic of .89 means that it is not significantly different from 0 so I 
cannot conclude that privatization of minimum security prisons has a positive effect on 
income in that county. However, the difference between minimum security prisons and 
the rest of the prison population warrants further research as this result indicates that 
they may not behave like medium or maximum-security facilities and thus could have 
different local economic impacts.  
Because this is only a “snapshot” of the counties, it uses data from only one point 
in time, I cannot rule out that private prisons are simply typically located in poorer 
counties that public prisons. While this is certainly a possibility, it seems unlikely to me 
that private prisons specifically would be placed in poorer counties than public prisons 
since prison placement, public or private, is the responsibility of the state. This doesn’t 
take any effects of lobbying into account, and it is possible that private prison 
companies have some amount of political sway and a greater incentive than public 
prisons to be located in lower income counties. However, my data doesn’t delineate 
between private prisons constructed by private companies and those that were simply 
existing prisons that were privatized, so depending on which population is larger, 
lobbying may or may not be a plausible explanation.  
!
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The insignificance of the private prison ratio in each of the employment rate 
regressions suggests that there is truly no local employment difference between a 
privately operated and a publically operated prison. This finding run contrary to the 
benefits implied by private prison companies through statements like “good, stable jobs” 
and “employing the best people in solid careers”28. Prisons as a whole may objectively 
increase employment, but private prisons do not seem to accomplish this any better or 
worse than publically operated prisons.  
It is possible that private prisons are uniquely better at offering some of the 
programs and structural aspects of prisons that do seem to significantly affect local 
employment, but further study would be needed to tease out that connection. 
Regression analysis incorporating an interaction between a measure of privateness and 
each of these statistically different aspects of prisons may produce insights into these 
relationships for many different economic indicators. One notable result is that counties 
with prisons that have work release programs experience modestly higher employment 
rates. This would suggest that inmates that complete their time in the prison may linger 
in the surrounding community after release, and that those inmates that have had 
training may be more employable. Inmates allowed to gather work experience while 
serving their sentence, are better able to become and remain employed in the area than 
similar inmates that haven’t had those opportunities. Sometimes, work release 
programs allow inmates, especially at lower security prisons, to maintain their former 
professional positions or to work in their field while serving their sentence. Clearly this 





may also be helping the overall economy in their community by holding and advancing 
in a steady job.  
The negative coefficients on counseling in the income model and drug 
awareness in both models may, at first glance, suggest that these programs have a 
depressing impact on county economies. While these may be the true effects of this 
kind of prison programs, I offer an alternative explanation. First, the negative coefficients 
on counseling and drug awareness programs in the income per capita model could be 
related to the level of compensation typically received by people doing this type of work. 
The average annual wage of a rehabilitation counselor and a mental health and 
substance abuse social worker in 2012 was $37,330 and $43,340 respectively. 
Correctional treatment specialists had a slightly higher mean annual wage, $52,380, but 
that average also includes probation officers29. Given that the average income per 
earner across my sample was $61,350.78, these low salaries could be why these 
programs appear to have a negative effect on income. Second, the statistically 
significant negative relationship between drug awareness programs and employment 
rate is probably more indicative of the types of prison populations that need such 
programs than the effect of the programs themselves. It seems likely that prisons with 
drug awareness programs are going to be housing inmates who are less likely to 
effectively participate in the work force upon release due to drug habits that prisons 
without these programs. This would explain the apparent negative effect of drug 






 Finally, the year in which a prison was built has a small but significant (at the 1% 
or 5% level) negative coefficient in each iteration of both models. It would make sense 
that in the past 20-30 years, we have been building prisons in poorer counties, making 
this a relationship mostly reflective of state building site selection. However, the 
coefficient is also very small. This is most likely due to the positive economic effect of 
building a new prison. Like any public works project, building a new prison would 
employ large amounts of people in construction and related businesses and provide an 
increase in contractors’ and others’ salaries. However, these two realities are conflated 
in the single YRBUILT variable. Including a “new” dummy that indicate if the prison is 




The biggest limitation of this study was the completeness of the data. Since the 
prison level data was gathered via survey, a lot of information was missing, and the 
answers given could have been skewed. Also, while employment rate and income per 
capita are good indicators of economic health in a community, they may not be the ones 
on which private prisons have the most direct impact. Further development in the 
literature about private prisons will help researchers narrow in on those aspects of a 
community that feel the public/private difference the most. 
Additionally, using one year of prison and corresponding census data invites 
problems with county selection. It is difficult to say if privateness or any other aspects of 
prisons are causing the effects shown or if these types of prisons are being placed in 
!
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those kinds of counties. As the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Bureau of the 
Census continue to provide more reliable and complete data on prisons, especially 
private prisons, and assuming the current trend in increasing privatization continues, 
these limitations should drop away. Changes over time due to privatizing an existing 
facility or adding a completely new private prison will become more evident, and 
hopefully future papers will be able to provide a clear explanation of the economic 
effects of private prisons on their communities.  
Significance 
While privatization alone only seems to impact the income in the county, different 
characteristics of prisons do seem to affect both income and employment in the areas in 
which those prisons are located. As the biggest determining factor in the success of a 
private prison is the contract, these characteristics should be addressed in any carefully 
constructed agreement to ensure that the most favorable outcomes are pursued. 
Further research should be conducted to explore the relationship between privatizing 
prisons and long-range consequences for the community and the inmates they serve. 
Table 2 shows that there seem to be some real differences between the production 
functions and operating realities of public and private prisons. These differences 
probably affect the community in some fashion. The benefits of work release and 
programs are apparent in the employment model provided, and the impact of the rest of 
these programs should be carefully studied. If we understand how the different aspects 
of a prison impact the surrounding communities or even the population more broadly, 
!
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we can structure our priorities for the American correctional system accordingly for as 
long as we are using the method of incarceration. 
That the private prison ratio was entirely insignificant is not a trivial result. As the 
privatization debate continues, private prison companies will attempt to win more 
contracts and expand by spreading promises of economic revitalization. While prisons 
may or may not have positive economic impacts on counties, private prisons do not 
seem to be uniquely better. Now that private prisons have grown to approximately 10% 
of all American prisons, it will become easier to discover the effects of these institutions 
on the people around them. For the most part, it seems that prisons function much like 
any other public works project or publically owned institution by employing the local 
workforce and attracting new businesses. However, unlike hospitals, schools, or fire 
departments, this government service involves the detention and punishment of citizens. 
This is a heavy responsibility and if the benefits of privatizing this process are not 
obvious, proven and secure, we may want to reconsider this growing trend.  
Prisons are a major reality of the current social and economic landscape of this 
county. Their local economic impacts are often overlooked in favor of implications for 
the State or for the inmates themselves. While those are also important considerations, 
it is crucial to remember the communities that support the institutions incarcerating our 
population. Prisons are currently our most prevalent solution for social deviance, and as 
incarceration rates continue to rise, choices about who should and can be responsible 
for this significant portion of the population and how they should run these 
!
!
establishments will have to be made with increasing frequency. We must include 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Construction 
 
Private Prisoner Ratio (pcounty)30 
A ratio of private to public prisoners. (# private prisoners in the county)18/(# public 
prisoners in the county)18. This ratio was then simplified to a dummy that = 1 when the 
ratio > .5 and the dummy = 0 when the ratio is < .5 so that counties could be classified 
as public or private.  
 
Interaction between Private Prisoner dummy and Minimum security ratio (pcmin) 
A term interacting privateness and minimum security. pcounty*min 
 
Staff Per Prisoner 
A ratio of prison staff (full and part time) to the total number of inmates. (total 
staff)18/(total inmates)30 
 
Sentence Greater than One Year 
Total number of prisoners with a sentence greater than 1 year.  
 
% Part Time30 
The number of part time positions as a percentage of the total staff. (number of part time 
positions)/(total staff) 
 
Number of Inmates/100030 
A measure of inmate population scaled down for interpretation. (total inmates)18/1000 
 
Prisoner Pop/County Pop30 
A measure of the concentration of prisoners in a county. (total inmates)/(county 
population) 
 
Total Number of Staff30 
Sum of reported full time and part time positions. (Full time staff)+(Part time staff) 
 
Maximum Security30 
A dummy variable provided to delineate maximum security facilities. The ICPSR survey 
defines maximum security as “a wall or double-fence perimeter, armed tower and/or 





a prisoner escaping from a cell was confined within the building; or by double security 
from the perimeter by bars, steel doors, or other hardware. All entry or exit was via trap  
gate or sally port.” 
 
Medium Security (omitted dummy)31 
A dummy variable provided to delineate medium security facilities. The ICPSR survey 
defines medium security as “Medium security facilities were characterized by a single or 
double fence perimeter with armed coverage by towers or patrols. Housing units were 
cells, rooms, or dormitories. Dormitories were living units designed or modified to 
accommodate 12 or more persons. All entry or exit was via trap gage or sally port.” 
 
Minimum Security31 
A dummy variable provided to delineate medium security facilities. The ICPSR survey 
defines minimum security as “Minimum or low security facilities were characterized by a 
fence or "posted" perimeter. Cell housing units were rooms or dormitories. Normal entry 
and exit were under visual surveillance.” 
 
Work Release Program31 
A dummy that differentiates between prisons with a work release program and those 
without. While the ICPSR survey does not provide a definition of a “work release 
program,” The question they asked of the prisons is “Does this facility operate a work 
release program that allows inmates to work in the community unsupervised by facility 
staff, but requires them to return to the facility at night?” the allowed answers were Yes 
and No. If a yes answer was given, the prison was then prompted to provide the number 
of participating inmates.31 
 
Employment 31 
A dummy that differentiates between prisons with an employment program and those 
without. While the ICPSR survey does not provide a definition of an “employment 




A dummy variable that identifies counties with “low education.” The ICPSR defines low 
education as “25 percent or more of residents 25-64 years old had neither a high school 








Percent of resident population black alone, 7/1/05; PctBlack05 = 100(Black05 / Pop05), 
rounded to two decimal places21 
 
% Hispanic33 
Percent of resident population Hispanic, 7/1/05; PctH05 = 100(H05 / Pop05), rounded to 
two decimal places21 
 
% County Employment: Construction33 
Percentage constructed from full-time and part-time nonfarm employment by the 
construction industry and total full-time and part-time employment. (total county 
construction employment)/(total county employment) 
 
% County Income: Construction33 
Percentage constructed from private nonfarm earnings by place of work from the 
construction industry and earnings by place of work. (county construction 
earnings)/(total county earnings) 
 
% County Employment: Agriculture33 
Percentage constructed from full-time and part-time farm employment and total full-time 
and part-time employment. (total county farm employment)/(total county employment) 
 
% County Income: Agriculture33 
Percentage constructed from farm earnings by place of work and earnings by place of 
work. (county farm earnings)/(total county earnings) 
 
Labor Force Participation Rate33 
Percentage of people considered eligible to work (older than 16) that are currently 
employed or unemployed. The ICSPR defines employed as “Persons 16 years and over 
in the civilian non-institutional population who, during the reference week, (a) did any 
work at all (at least 1 hour) as paid employees; worked in their own business, 
profession, or on their own farm, or worked 15 hours or more as unpaid workers in an 
enterprise operated by a member of the family; and (b) all those who were not working 
but who had jobs or businesses from which they were temporarily absent because of 
vacation, illness, bad weather, childcare problems, maternity or paternity leave, labor-





they were paid for the time off or were seeking other jobs. Each employed person is 
counted only once, even if he or she holds more than one job. Excluded are persons 
whose only activity consisted of work around their own house (painting, repairing, or 
own home housework) or volunteer work for religious, charitable, and other 
organizations.” The ICPSR defines unemployed as “Persons aged 16 years and older 
who had no employment during the reference week, were available for work, except for 
temporary illness, and had made specific efforts to find employment sometime during 
the 4-week period ending with the reference week. Persons who were waiting to be 
recalled to a job from which they had been laid off need not have been looking for work 
to be classified as unemployed.” 
 
Midwest34 
A dummy variable constructed to capture the variation in the data due to the regional 
differences of being in the Midwest. The Midwest includes: Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, 
Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota. 
Northeast34 
A dummy variable constructed to capture the variation in the data due to the regional 
differences of being in the Northeast. The Northeast includes: Connecticut, Maine, 




A dummy variable constructed to capture the variation in the data due to the regional 
differences of being in the South. The South includes: Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, 




A dummy variable constructed to capture the variation in the data due to the 
regional differences of being in the West. The West includes: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, 
New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, 










N& Mean& Std.&Dev.& Public&
Minimum!




30& 0.333333& 0.479463& Low&
Education&
262& 0.194657& 0.3966938& 0.0772&(L1.7733)&
%&Black& 30& 19.584& 22.73428& %&Black& 262& 13.33405& 15.58076& 0.0495&(L1.9728)&
%!Hispanic! 30! 13.711! 19.29536! %!Hispanic! 262! 9.823397! 15.07463! 0.1956!(F1.2972)!
%!Emp!by!
Construction!
27! 0.064473! 0.021169! %!Emp!by!
Construction!
246! 0.066729! 0.0237466! 0.6364!(.4733)!
%!Earned!
Construction!
27! 0.066846! 0.025296! %!Earned!
Construction!
246! 0.068803! 0.0321895! 0.7602!(.3056)!
%!Emp!by!Ag! 30! 0.093551! 0.102581! %!Emp!by!Ag! 257! 0.069806! 0.0880905! 0.171!(F1.3725)!
%&Earned&
from&Ag&
30& 0.010888& 0.033931& %&Earned&
from&Ag&
255& 0.036663& 0.0843653& 0.0989&(1.6556)&
LFPR! 30! 0.605571! 0.086057! LFPR! 262! 0.617232! 0.0674259! 0.3848!(.8703)!
%!Bush!04! 30! 53.229! 19.37102! %!Bush!04! 258! 56.11473! 12.94898! 0.2771!(1.089)!
Crime!Rate! 28! 3916.75! 1732.754! Crime!Rate! 242! 3710.61! 1777.217! 0.5607!(F.5825)!
Pop!Growth!
’00F‘05!
30! 5.070333! 9.408224! Pop!Growth!
’00F‘05!
262! 4.980992! 7.119471! 0.95!(.06288)!




Employment&Rate& Obs& Mean& Std.&Dev.& Min& Max&
Full&Sample& 698! 0.9436752! 0.0188333! 0.8398722! 0.974578!
pcounty&=&1& 63! 0.9398521! 0.0214264! 0.8740367! 0.9702296!
pcounty&=&0& 635! 0.9440544! 0.0185324! 0.8398722! 0.974578!
min&>&0& 292! 0.9445711! 0.0196814! 0.8398722! 0.9737944!
pcmin&>&0& 30! 0.9424516! 0.0228804! 0.8740367! 0.9702296!
pubcmin&>&0& 262! 0.9448138! 0.0193168! 0.8398722! 0.9737944!
















Income&Per&Capita& Obs& Mean& Std.&Dev.& Min& Max&
Full&Sample& 692! 27661.27! 7729.167! 14644! 93377!
pcounty&=&1& 63! 25642.25! 9033.363! 14644! 62614!
pcounty&=&0& 629! 27863.49! 7564.848! 15271! 93377!
min&>&0& 287! 29302.32! 8346.233! 15271! 93377!
pcmin&>&0& 30! 29430.37! 10854.04! 17424! 62614!
pubcmin&>&0& 257! 29287.38! 8029.632! 15271! 93377!
max&>&0& 245! 28178.99! 8086.626! 14644! 67269!
!
Table&D:&Summary&Statistics&for&Average&Income&per&Earner&
Income/Employment& Obs& Mean& Std.&Dev.& Min& Max&
Full&Sample& 692! 61350.78! 12483.65! 38081.95! 176764.8!
pcounty&=&1& 63! 59767.92! 14204.42! 44868.12! 116746.9!
pcounty&=&0& 629! 61509.31! 12299.57! 38081.95! 176764.8!
min&>&0& 287! 63203.55! 13560.53! 41319.34! 176764.8!
pcmin&>&0& 30! 64400.93! 18091.35! 49077.56! 116746.9!






& Est.!Coefficient! tFstatistic! Est.!Coefficient! tFstatistic!
pcounty& 1613.029! 0.89! 1461.554! 0.82!
Year&Built& F25.7693! F1.38! ! !
Number&Hispanic& 0.782466! 1.6! ! !
%&Part&Time& 9863.793! 1.39! ! !
escapes& 454.9783***! 2.99! ! !
medtreat& 4742.479**! 2.38! ! !
drugtreat& F439.955! F0.43! ! !
counseling& F7675.79*! F1.92! ! !
wrkrelease& 1839.025! 1.54! ! !
littraining& F1553.4! F1.57! ! !
drugaware& 3401.753! 0.9! ! !
alcaware& F4103.19! F1.06! ! !
psychcounsel& 484.1143! 0.49! ! !
sexoffcounsel& F746.65! F0.57! ! !
employment& 1170.396! 1.25! ! !
Prisoner&Concentration& F16785.4! F0.63! ! !
Low&Education& F6462.52***! F5.47! F7749.58***! F8.4!
%Black& 54.08816*! 1.7! 72.96799**! 2.32!
%Earned&From&Ag& F12422.9**! F2.53! F12321.8***! F2.96!
SO& 91.19579! 0.1! 561.2096! 0.65!
NE& 7282.437***! 2.85! 7317.278***! 3.02!
WE& 1847.833! 1.38! 3610.549**! 2.52!
Constant& 79437.53! 2.15! 28462.63! 43.67!
N& 279! ! 285! !
F&Lstat& 8.47! ! 15.38! !







& Est.!Coefficient! tFstatistic! Est.!Coefficient! tFstatistic!
pcounty& F0.00125! F0.32! 0.001477! 0.45!
Year&Built& F5.2EF05! F1.39! ! !
Number&Hispanic& F2.17EF07! F0.28! ! !
%&Part&Time& 2.11EF02! 1.21! ! !
escapes& 1.16EF04! 0.68! ! !
medtreat& 0.010995! 2.67! ! !
drugtreat& 0.000844! 0.33! ! !
counseling& F6.05EF03! F0.67! ! !
wrkrelease& 0.002505! 1.05! ! !
littraining& F0.00478! F1.69! ! !
drugaware& 0.000562! 0.08! ! !
alcaware& F0.00438! F0.67! ! !
psychcounsel& 0.004554! 1.73! ! !
sexoffcounsel& F0.00418! F1.28! ! !
employment& 0.005388! 2.15! ! !
Prisoner&Concentration& 0.022469! 0.71! ! !
Low&Education& F0.01425! F4.33! F0.01832! F5.24!
%Black& F0.00049! F5! F0.00047! F5.19!
%Earned&From&Ag& 0.00835! 0.65! 0.011217! 1!
SO& 0.01394! 5.45! 0.013899! 5.58!
NE& 0.012543! 4.89! 0.011811! 4.59!
WE& F9.8EF05! F0.03! F0.00082! F0.21!
Constant& 1.046254! 14.22! 0.945169! 452.46!
N& 279! ! 285! !
F&Lstat& 7.27! ! 11.92! !
RLsquared& 0.4067! ! 0.3311! !
Correlation/Covariance Matrix for Full Model 
!. 
          WE     0.0144  -0.0216  -0.1114  -0.0581   0.0649  -0.0011  -0.0895  -0.2407   0.3024   0.0057   0.1222  -0.0134  -0.0010   0.1769  -0.3638  -0.1294   1.0000
          NE     0.1594   0.1723   0.2926   0.2091   0.1069   0.0990  -0.1888  -0.1840  -0.1131  -0.0843  -0.0571  -0.2114  -0.2315   0.0497  -0.4090   1.0000
          SO    -0.2252  -0.2124  -0.0979  -0.1772  -0.1770  -0.0702   0.4041   0.5088   0.0902   0.2062   0.0373   0.1467   0.2178  -0.0896   1.0000
countypops~d    -0.0428  -0.0213   0.0744   0.0113   0.0830   0.0842  -0.0640   0.0117   0.2261  -0.0591  -0.0059  -0.2679  -0.2578   1.0000
   PctBush04    -0.1264  -0.1349  -0.1308  -0.0624  -0.0151   0.0619  -0.0096  -0.3220   0.0074   0.2672   0.1673   0.2996   1.0000
  pctempbyag    -0.0642  -0.0289  -0.1863  -0.0594  -0.0815  -0.0623   0.2946  -0.0251   0.1229  -0.1354  -0.1377   1.0000
pctearnedf~n    -0.0906  -0.0028   0.0764   0.0289   0.0513   0.0701  -0.2034  -0.1943  -0.0088   0.8974   1.0000
pctempbyco~n    -0.0973  -0.0298   0.0754  -0.0004   0.0202   0.0562  -0.1253  -0.1569  -0.0712   1.0000
   PctHisp05    -0.2161  -0.2287  -0.1532  -0.1319  -0.0080   0.0369   0.2347  -0.1663   1.0000
  PctBlack05     0.0575  -0.0102  -0.0466  -0.0632  -0.1123  -0.1517   0.4220   1.0000
   LowEduc04    -0.0754  -0.0695  -0.0975  -0.0507  -0.0875  -0.0982   1.0000
  lifeskills     0.0265   0.2086   0.2500   0.2179   0.3836   1.0000
  employment    -0.0159   0.1256   0.2704   0.1851   1.0000
sexoffcoun~l     0.1506   0.4944   0.3985   1.0000
  hivcounsel     0.1174   0.4576   1.0000
psychcounsel     0.3150   1.0000
    alcaware     1.0000
                                                                                                                                                                       
               alcaware psychc~l hivcou~l sexoff~l employ~t lifesk~s LowEd~04 PctBl~05 PctHi~05 pctemp.. pctear~n pctemp~g PctBu~04 county~d       SO       NE       WE
          WE    -0.0278   0.0445   0.0689  -0.0343   0.0109   0.0521   0.0375   0.0804  -0.1486   0.0915  -0.0088   0.1416  -0.0544  -0.0173   0.0824   0.0582   0.0244   0.0150  -0.0026   0.0243
          NE     0.1585   0.2886  -0.1144  -0.0731  -0.0342  -0.0976  -0.1665   0.0678   0.1155   0.0544   0.2480  -0.0101  -0.0147  -0.0694   0.0512  -0.0191  -0.0192  -0.0456   0.1333   0.1510
          SO    -0.0238  -0.2431   0.1293   0.1319  -0.0276   0.1089   0.1837  -0.0703   0.0248  -0.0674  -0.1876  -0.0638   0.0608   0.0900  -0.0678  -0.0033   0.0218   0.0072  -0.1415  -0.2127
countypops~d     0.0967   0.3943  -0.0223   0.0413   0.0138   0.0840   0.0147   0.1824   0.1070   0.1594   0.0829   0.3010   0.0397   0.1818   0.0306   0.0548  -0.0006   0.1112  -0.0859  -0.0377
   PctBush04     0.2379  -0.2726  -0.0150  -0.0073  -0.0127   0.0061   0.0327   0.0254  -0.0225   0.0373  -0.0663  -0.0161   0.0879  -0.0379  -0.0209  -0.0525  -0.0547  -0.1065   0.0069  -0.1411
  pctempbyag    -0.1539  -0.4873   0.1546   0.0278  -0.0559  -0.0893   0.0787  -0.0573  -0.0937  -0.0487  -0.1230   0.0223   0.0466  -0.0975  -0.1011  -0.1029  -0.0387  -0.1632   0.1044  -0.0667
pctearnedf~n     0.2920   0.1295  -0.0613   0.0209  -0.0157   0.0643  -0.0229  -0.0660  -0.1102  -0.0629  -0.0887   0.0917  -0.0855  -0.0048   0.0069   0.0298  -0.0182   0.0221  -0.1203  -0.0964
pctempbyco~n     0.2781   0.0298  -0.0746   0.0177  -0.0216   0.0640   0.0234  -0.0773  -0.0931  -0.0764  -0.1128   0.0706  -0.0661  -0.0021  -0.0014   0.0241  -0.0259   0.0197  -0.1030  -0.1028
   PctHisp05    -0.0058  -0.0421   0.1489   0.1261  -0.0663   0.1022   0.1638   0.1442  -0.0035   0.1345   0.0179   0.1022   0.1847   0.0086  -0.0625  -0.0615   0.2589  -0.0214  -0.0118  -0.2149
  PctBlack05    -0.3108  -0.1281   0.0643   0.0161   0.0404  -0.0403   0.1023   0.0166   0.1925   0.0113  -0.0221  -0.0916   0.0131   0.0324  -0.0044   0.0843  -0.0412  -0.0568  -0.0769   0.0858
   LowEduc04    -0.3510  -0.4257   0.1331   0.0482   0.0378  -0.0521   0.1641   0.0938   0.1467   0.0968  -0.0323  -0.0032   0.0692  -0.0303  -0.0907  -0.0374   0.0613  -0.0924   0.0597  -0.0421
  lifeskills     0.1713   0.0591   0.0557   0.0360   0.1183  -0.1766   0.0063   0.0860   0.0753   0.0916   0.0990  -0.0179   0.0621  -0.0740   0.0706   0.0544   0.0137  -0.0621   0.2569   0.0149
  employment     0.0951   0.0472  -0.1133  -0.1037   0.1339  -0.1444   0.0047   0.0906   0.0840   0.0995   0.1215   0.0458   0.0640  -0.1222   0.0120   0.0451   0.0096   0.0102   0.1562  -0.0324
sexoffcoun~l     0.0234  -0.0038  -0.0806  -0.0875   0.2459  -0.3112  -0.0448   0.1211   0.1337   0.1224   0.1636  -0.0714  -0.0401  -0.0461   0.0882   0.0821   0.0436  -0.0907   0.2117   0.1284
  hivcounsel     0.1583   0.0994  -0.0407  -0.0095   0.1412  -0.1618  -0.0142   0.0968   0.1179   0.0986   0.1453  -0.0159  -0.1047  -0.0701   0.1275   0.1033   0.0325   0.0490   0.1015   0.1092
psychcounsel    -0.0205   0.0150   0.0351  -0.1116   0.2651  -0.3934  -0.0626   0.1146   0.1280   0.1102   0.1900  -0.1008  -0.1119  -0.0092   0.1744   0.1903  -0.0518  -0.0761   0.3147   0.3141
    alcaware    -0.1980   0.0270  -0.0229  -0.1056  -0.0684  -0.0427  -0.1188  -0.0556  -0.0416  -0.0589   0.0021  -0.0701  -0.2043  -0.0545   0.0584  -0.0353   0.0208  -0.0345   0.2286   0.9388
   drugaware    -0.2197   0.0239  -0.0093  -0.0790  -0.0910  -0.0406  -0.0935  -0.0579  -0.0391  -0.0620  -0.0016  -0.0491  -0.2064  -0.0489   0.0656  -0.0407   0.0205  -0.0719   0.2450   1.0000
 littraining    -0.0612  -0.1171  -0.0354  -0.1519   0.0892  -0.3356  -0.0713   0.0915   0.0865   0.0871   0.1405  -0.0888   0.0560  -0.0489   0.0547   0.0584   0.0030  -0.2666   1.0000
  wrkrelease     0.1301   0.1787  -0.0674   0.0052  -0.0631   0.3248  -0.2031  -0.1525  -0.1756  -0.1545  -0.1640   0.1909  -0.1533   0.0673   0.0029   0.0374   0.1039   1.0000
  counseling    -0.0185  -0.0487   0.1224   0.2134  -0.0242   0.0683   0.0484  -0.0393  -0.0436  -0.0395  -0.0450   0.3214  -0.0305  -0.0106  -0.0215  -0.0216   1.0000
 mentaltreat     0.1053   0.0598  -0.0833  -0.0708   0.2430  -0.1341  -0.0396   0.0790   0.0696   0.0755   0.1500  -0.0023   0.0344  -0.0083   0.5324   1.0000
    medtreat     0.0946   0.1005  -0.0820  -0.0702   0.1356  -0.1350  -0.1321   0.0685   0.0565   0.0690   0.1445  -0.0188   0.0226  -0.0094   1.0000
     escapes     0.0085   0.1182  -0.0099  -0.0134  -0.0332   0.1131  -0.0491   0.0961   0.1399   0.0985   0.0677  -0.0109   0.0109   1.0000
 discreports    -0.0614  -0.0611  -0.0585  -0.0154   0.1986  -0.2073  -0.0127   0.6396   0.5967   0.6204   0.6246  -0.0799   1.0000
 pctparttime     0.0823   0.0849   0.0812   0.1721  -0.0280   0.1274   0.0098  -0.0563  -0.0706  -0.0492  -0.1094   1.0000
    totstaff     0.0066   0.1021  -0.1144  -0.0836   0.3004  -0.3285  -0.0925   0.7861   0.7907   0.7687   1.0000
 SENTMORE1YR    -0.0339  -0.0132  -0.0608  -0.0553   0.2369  -0.2721   0.0125   0.9871   0.8374   1.0000
      NUMBLK    -0.0546  -0.0035  -0.0692  -0.0545   0.2539  -0.2912  -0.0013   0.8486   1.0000
   INMATETOT    -0.0346   0.0021  -0.0404  -0.0323   0.2318  -0.2607   0.0113   1.0000
     YRBUILT    -0.1319  -0.1898   0.1807   0.0757  -0.0926  -0.0056   1.0000
         min     0.0266   0.1275   0.0417   0.2599  -0.4325   1.0000
         max     0.0299  -0.0320  -0.1510  -0.1230   1.0000
       pcmin     0.0069   0.0401   0.6394   1.0000
     pcounty    -0.0921  -0.1085   1.0000
   IncPerCap     0.4166   1.0000
     EmpRate     1.0000
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
                EmpRate IncPer~p  pcounty    pcmin      max      min  YRBUILT INMATE~T   NUMBLK SENTMO~R totstaff pctpar~e discre~s  escapes medtreat mental~t counse~g wrkrel~e littra~g drugaw~e
